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Abstract
There has been growing interest among practitioners and academics in the 
emergence of intergovernmental relations between local and Aboriginal 
governments in Canada. Initial research has focused on describing the 
nature of these relations but has yet to develop any theoretical expectations 
regarding why some communities are more likely to cooperate than 
others. We addresses this lacuna by developing a theoretical framework 
for explaining the emergence of cooperation between Aboriginal and local 
governments. After identifying a set of variables and specifying how they are 
likely to affect the propensity of communities to cooperate, we conclude 
with a discussion of how future researchers might use this framework to 
investigate cooperation and noncooperation between Aboriginal and local 
governments in Canada and in other settler societies.
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Introduction
What factors affect the emergence (and persistence) of cooperative relation-
ships between Aboriginal governments and local authorities? This research 
question has become an important one for practitioners and scholars inter-
ested in local/regional government, Indigenous politics, federalism, and pub-
lic administration for a number of reasons. As urban regions expand their 
development, and as Aboriginal communities increase their land base and 
jurisdiction through land purchases, self-government and land claims agree-
ments, the result has been more frequent interactions between Aboriginal and 
local governments regarding land use, service provision, resource sharing, 
and cultural and economic development (Abele and Prince 2002; Alcantara 
and Nelles 2009; Government of British Columbia 2006; Greater Vancouver 
Regional District 2005). Coordination, or the lack thereof, on these issues, 
can have a powerful effect on both communities.
Successful land use coordination can create or support joint economic development 
opportunities and more livable communities overall. On the other hand, lack of 
land use coordination can be a major source of tension and spur conflicts between 
neighboring communities, leading to servicing problems and to the need for 
dispute avoidance and resolution mechanisms. Conflicts can arise over broad 
community objectives or specific cross-border land use impacts such as those 
involving noise, smell, light (or lack thereof), increased traffic, ground water 
pollution, and others. (Union of British Columbia Municipalities 2000, p. 3)
Given the important policy implications of this emerging type of intergov-
ernmental relationship, a range of policy actors at a variety of levels have 
shown a strong interest in finding ways to facilitate further cooperation 
among Aboriginal and local governments. For instance, in Canada, a number 
of federal and provincial government departments (in Ontario and British 
Columbia), and municipal and Aboriginal umbrella organizations (both 
national and regional), have independently or jointly produced reports and 
conferences aimed at helping local and Aboriginal governments initiate and 
sustain cooperative intergovernmental relations with each other. Their rea-
soning for pursuing these activities is that not only do municipal governments 
have a legal obligation to consult neighboring Aboriginal communities, but 
that there are important instrumental benefits as well (Abele and Prince 2002, 
pp. 226-227; Nelles and Alcantara 2011). “Strong municipal-Aboriginal rela-
tions can assist in meeting a range of objectives, including identifying areas 
of mutual interest and developing joint initiatives, meeting regulatory require-
ments for community development, partnering on service delivery and 
resource management” (Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing 
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2009, p. 2). For Indigenous groups in particular, establishing cooperative 
intergovernmental relations with local governments are also desirable. 
According to Coates and Morrison (2009), the success of Aboriginal self-
government is contingent on
effective and harmonious relations with local, regional, provincial/territorial, and 
national governments . . . Where there have been tensions, for example between 
the Kamloops First Nation and the city government in the 1980s, progress on 
economic and community development came to a halt. Where levels of co-operation 
are high, Kamloops again providing a good example, as do Westbank, the 
Squamish Nation, Saskatoon, and many northern communities, major changes and 
advances have been possible. (p. 118)
In this article, we build on the existing research to develop a theoretical 
framework1 for explaining cooperation and noncooperation between 
Aboriginal and local governments in Canada and perhaps other settler coun-
tries, such as the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. Our focus will 
mostly be on Indian Act bands, although our framework does provide the 
theoretical tools to examine other types of Indigenous self-government struc-
tures. For the most part, existing research has focused mainly on developing 
a typology of agreements (which are a form of formal cooperation between 
Aboriginal and local actors) that are emerging in Canada (Nelles and 
Alcantara 2011) and on developing a framework for explaining informal 
cooperation as part of the broader comprehensive land claims negotiations 
process (Alcantara and Nelles 2009). By formal cooperation we mean the 
variety of intergovernmental agreements (Nelles and Alcantara 2011) and 
intergovernmental bodies created by Aboriginal and local governments to 
facilitate cooperation (Gayda 2012). By informal cooperation, we mean situ-
ations where Aboriginal and local government actors work together without 
the use of formal mechanisms (Alcantara and Nelles 2009). No one has yet 
tried to construct a framework that explains formal cooperation between 
local and Aboriginal governments and so our paper attempts to fill that 
important lacuna.
Our hope is that scholars will use the theoretical propositions generated in 
this article to guide their empirical analysis of Aboriginal-local government 
relations in Canada and in other settler societies. We also envision practitio-
ners using our theoretical arguments to pursue stronger ties with their neigh-
boring Aboriginal/local communities. Of course, Aboriginal (and perhaps 
local) communities are extremely diverse in nature; in Canada, for instance, 
there are approximately 630 First Nations and dozens of Inuit and Metis com-
munities, many of whom have different languages, cultures, histories, and 
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political/legal institutions. Although our framework was constructed to be 
flexible enough to capture this diversity, we realize that future empirical 
work will likely lead to important modifications in our theoretical frame-
work. Nonetheless, we are confident that our framework provides a useful 
starting point for empirically investigating the factors that affect the propen-
sity of Aboriginal and local governments to cooperate.
The article begins by briefly describing the lay of the land in Canada as it 
relates to Aboriginal-local intergovernmental cooperation. Next, we review 
the literature on Aboriginal-settler relations to situate these developments 
within that broader context. Finally, we sketch out our theoretical framework 
and specify the variables that we think have a strong effect on cooperation, 
before ending with some final thoughts about how future researchers might 
use this framework empirically to study a variety of relations in countries 
with significant Indigenous populations. In this sense, our work follows in 
the tradition of Feiock (2007, 2009), who has written theoretical articles that 
others have used to inform and guide their empirical work on intermunicipal 
collaboration (see Andersen and Pierre 2010).
The History of Local Government–Indigenous 
Government Relationships in Canada
Despite their importance, very little is known about these relations beyond 
some general and localized descriptions (Abele and Prince 2002; Nelles and 
Alcantara 2011). In a recent survey of trends in British Columbia, for instance, 
Nelles and Alcantara (2011, p. 326) analyzed 93 publicly available intergov-
ernmental agreements between local and Aboriginal governments, finding 
that the number of agreements has increased steadily over time. The majority 
of these agreements were “jurisdictional negotiation” agreements in which 
the Aboriginal government agreed to pay a yearly fee to the municipality in 
exchange for the provision of fire protection, garbage collection, snow 
removal, and the like, to the Aboriginal community. Second most common 
were “relationship-building” agreements, in which the signatories agreed to 
work toward establishing a more formalized cooperative relationship. 
Typically, these agreements included a set of common principles, such as 
mutual recognition and respect, and a commitment to communicate and/or 
meet regularly to discuss issues of common concern. A third set of agree-
ments attempted to “decolonize” relations between the two governments. In 
addition to including many of the same provisions found in the “relationship-
building” agreements, decolonization agreements went further by attempting 
to establish a more just and equal relationship between local and Aboriginal 
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governments. Many of these agreements, for instance, contained statements 
about the existence and recognition of the inherent right of Aboriginal self-
government, Aboriginal rights and title, and Aboriginal ownership of their 
traditional territories since “time immemorial” (Nelles and Alcantara 2011, 
p. 320). Finally, one agreement in the sample dealt with capacity building, in 
which the neighboring local government agreed to provide the First Nation 
with self-government expertise and training (Nelles and Alcantara 2011, 
p. 321). The classification of these agreements by type can provide useful 
insight into the prevalence of certain types of relationships. In the theoretical 
framework presented in this article, we focus on the emergence of coopera-
tion between Aboriginal actors and local governments without distinguishing 
types.
Our own preliminary research confirms that these agreements are not lim-
ited to British Columbia, but instead can be found across Canada. Our ongo-
ing research has found approximately 12 formal agreements in Nova Scotia, 
97 in Ontario, 52 in Saskatchewan, and 6 in Yukon Territory. We have also 
found dozens of informal agreements in all of these regions, and we expect to 
find more in the rest of the provinces and territories as we complete our data 
collection. We have not yet begun to collect agreements from the United 
States but preliminary discussions with Indigenous scholars in that country 
indicate that such agreements exist; we also expect that they exist in other 
settler countries as well.
In short, the existing research and our own data collection efforts suggest 
that these agreements are emerging across Canada in greater numbers, span-
ning the four categories of agreements originally developed by Nelles and 
Alcantara (2011). Coupled with these empirical trends is a strong interest 
among government and nongovernmental actors in generating a set of best 
practices for fostering cooperative relations between local and Aboriginal 
governments. Thus, there is both a demand and need for scholarship that 
develops a theoretical framework for explaining the emergence (or lack) of 
intergovernmental cooperation between Aboriginal and local governments.
Aboriginal-Settler Relations in Canada: Situating 
Indigenous-Municipal Relations
In general, much of the literature on Aboriginal-settler relations in Canada 
has focused on the relationship between Aboriginal governments and the fed-
eral, provincial, and territorial jurisdictions in which they are embedded 
(Abele and Prince 2003; Alcantara 2013; Alcantara and Nelles 2013; Bakvis, 
Baier, and Brown 2009; Papillon 2008, 2012). Very few scholars, however, 
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have looked at the intergovernmental relationships between local and 
Aboriginal governments. Given the lack of existing scholarship on this topic, 
some researchers have sought to adapt elements of the broad literature on 
intermunicipal relationships and metropolitan governance to explain the 
emergence of Aboriginal-municipal intergovernmental relations in Canada 
(see Alcantara and Nelles 2009; Gayda 2012). The literature on intermunici-
pal cooperation attempts to determine how collective action emerges between 
local authorities. It asks what factors affect the construction of partnerships 
between local governments at the regional scale and why cooperation has 
emerged as a governance strategy in some metropolitan areas, but not in oth-
ers (Feiock 2007; Nelles 2012). Understanding Aboriginal-local relation-
ships invokes similar questions: Why have cooperative relationships 
developed between some Aboriginal governments and neighboring local 
authorities where parties recognize a potential for mutual benefit while in 
other cases no, or even antagonistic, relationships have emerged?
In their application of intermunicipal cooperation frameworks, Alcantara 
and Nelles (2009) note that despite the breadth of the literature and its engage-
ment with a wide variety of theoretical approaches, there exist few compre-
hensive theories of metropolitan governance. The most highly developed are 
rational choice approaches that focus on the cost-benefit analyses that under-
pin decisions to cooperate and individual case studies that examine best prac-
tices in metropolitan governance (see Feiock 2007, 2009; Steinacker 2004). 
However, none of the literature they reviewed offered a framework that could 
be used to test the influence of a wide variety of variables—including institu-
tions and opportunities, but also variables that explore the impact of factors 
such as capital and leadership—in Aboriginal-local relationships. In response, 
Alcantara and Nelles (2009) modified their own framework to explain the 
relationship between Kwanlin Dün First Nation and the local government of 
Whitehorse in Yukon Territory, Canada, which was an example of informal 
cooperation in the context of modern treaty negotiations.
This framework was based on research conducted by Nelles (2012) on 
intermunicipal cooperation with the aim of creating a theoretical approach 
that could explain the emergence of collective action between local govern-
ments. She argued that the universe of variables that can affect the emergence 
of metropolitan governance can be reduced to three broad categories: institu-
tions, opportunities, and civic capital. Her central argument was that, while 
institutional and opportunity variables are valuable to understanding the 
emergence of partnerships, in any given case their impact was not predict-
able. That is, the same institutional conditions could have positive or negative 
impacts on the emergence of partnerships depending on the case. Similarly, 
opportunities can create either positive or negative incentives to cooperate. 
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However, civic capital only has a positive influence on intermunicipal coop-
eration. Therefore, regardless of contextual factors such as institutions and 
opportunities the emergence of metropolitan cooperation was more likely in 
places with greater civic capital.
Alcantara and Nelles (2009) adopt a similar framework and reach similar 
conclusions. The major differences between the two approaches after adapta-
tion for the Aboriginal-local context are detailed in the first two columns of 
Table 1. The most significant of these were the addition of qualifications 
about the capacity of local and Aboriginal leaders; access to resources as a 
form of power asymmetry; government intervention in treaty negotiations as 
a form of intervention; and the omission of several factors that did not apply 
to the Aboriginal-local or strictly Canadian context (i.e., local party politics, 
group size and previous government structures). More recently Gayda (2012) 
applied a similar framework to her analysis of relationships between the City 
of Elliot Lake, the Province of Ontario, and Serpent River First Nations. 
While this modified “civic capital” framework has proven useful in the anal-
ysis of the Kwanlin Dün and Serpent River cases, we believe that the content, 
conceptualization, and operationalization of these variables can be improved 
for broader application.
Toward a Theoretical Framework
Similar to some of Richard Feiock’s (2007, 2009) work on metropolitan gov-
ernance, the primary purpose of this article is to propose an updated, and 
more precisely elaborated, theoretical framework to guide future empirical 
analyses of cooperative relationships between Aboriginal and local govern-
ments.2 This framework builds on previous research (discussed earlier) by 
Alcantara and Nelles (2009) and Gayda (2012) but with several key differ-
ences: The framework outlined here introduces more nuances between vari-
ables, conceptualizes and categorizes variables differently, and goes a step 
further to operationalize the variables for use across comparative cases.
Background Considerations
This theoretical framework begins with the assumption that in any case 
examined, there will have been an opportunity to collaborate—that is, a prob-
lem that could have been solved by Aboriginal-local government collective 
action—and that all parties to the partnership have the potential to benefit 
from the relationship. That is, this framework is not intended to explain inac-
tion where cooperation may only benefit one party. Rather, it is formulated to 
explore why cooperation emerges, or does not, in areas where a potential 
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mutual benefit from collective action has been identified and is recognized by 
all parties.3
A second caveat is that although we have adapted our approach from lit-
erature on local intergovernmental relationships we want to emphasize that 
we recognize that Aboriginal governments are not the same as other Canadian 
local authorities, nor would we argue that they should be treated as such. 
However, they share a number of similarities that justify the use of the inter-
governmental model with modifications sensitive to key differences (Nelles 
and Alcantara 2011). From a structural point of view, municipal and (most) 
Aboriginal governments (e.g., band council-style communities) in Canada 
Table 1. Factors Affecting the Emergence of Indigenous-Municipal Cooperation.
Institutions   How constrained are the leaders of each party in 
autonomously committing to a partnership?
  How many individuals/interests are involved in ratifying 
participation in the partnership?
  Is the Treaty and self-government status of the 
Aboriginal partner(s) a barrier to cooperation?
Resources   Does the partnership require a significant commitment 
of money, time, staff, expertise?
  How able are each of the potential partners to fulfill 
each of these commitments?
External  
interventions
  Are other levels of government directly involved in 
partnership negotiations?
  Did decisions taken at other levels of government 
influence negotiations or decisions to cooperate?
History   Have other partnerships been concluded between these 
actors? Were they successful?
  Has the historical relationship between parties been 
amicable or contentious?
Polarizing events   Have any polarizing events encouraged, discouraged or 
complicated partnership building?




  How socially integrated is the region?
  Are there significant (nonpolitical) intercommunity 
networks?
  Are there prominent civic leaders?
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are similar across a number of dimensions. They are both forms of govern-
ment to whom political power has been devolved to administer a legally 
bounded territory, to provide services to their constituents, and to participate 
in the localized implementation of policies developed at senior levels of gov-
ernment. Both forms of government consist of democratically elected coun-
cils and leaders and, since the 1988 amendment of the Indian Act, wield 
similar revenue raising and economic development tools. Finally, while 
Aboriginal governments are often involved in policy areas and challenges 
that are distinctive from non-Aboriginal communities, a large proportion of 
the daily concerns that occupy municipal politicians are also shared by First 
Nations leaders. Yet, it is important to note that many First Nations reject the 
characterization of their governments as municipal, despite the similarities.
The key structural differences between the two types of government con-
cern their constitutional status and status of relationships with other levels of 
government. Local and Aboriginal governments in Canada fall under the 
constitutional purview of different levels of government: Provinces are 
responsible for municipalities (The Constitution Act, 1867 §92.8), while the 
responsibility for “Indians, and Lands reserved for Indians” (The Constitution 
Act, 1867 §91.24) belongs to the federal government. Furthermore, their 
roles are established by different sets of legislation. Aboriginal issues are 
governed largely by the Indian Act while local governments are governed by 
provincial municipal acts and, on occasion, specific local charters. On a prac-
tical level, this means that each form of localized government—Aboriginal 
and non—are subject to very different sets of legal frameworks and have 
hierarchical and historical relationships with different parts of provincial and 
federal bureaucracies. Finally, while the legal status of local governments in 
Canada is fixed since the Baldwin Act (1849) the legal status of individual 
Aboriginal communities varies by province depending on their treaty status. 
While many Aboriginal groups have concluded land claims negotiations with 
the Crown, there are still a significant number that are in the process of con-
cluding, have failed to establish, or have not yet attempted to negotiate trea-
ties (Alcantara 2013). Treaty status can therefore be an important institutional 
distinction between Aboriginal groups, and accord rights that are distinctive 
from those of local governments. Furthermore, the treaty experience is an 
important historical context, which may profoundly shape the propensity of 
Aboriginal groups to trust and enter into further relationships with Canadian 
governments (Alcantara 2008).
Despite these important differences, it is possible, and fruitful, to analyze 
relationships between Aboriginal and municipal governments using a single 
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theoretical framework. Even analyses of intermunicipal relationships that fail 
to recognize differences between the partners do so at their own peril. Our 
aim here is to construct a framework that incorporates these main distinctions 
between different types of local authorities, be they Aboriginal or municipal. 
We expect that these relationships will display many of the same attributes 
observed in the intermunicipal governance literature, namely, that a wide 
variety of variables conspire to encourage or discourage partnerships, but that 
only a few of these variables will be predictive.
The Foundations of Cooperation: Capacity and Willingness
One of the main differences between the framework developed here and the 
one introduced by Alcantara and Nelles (2009) is the conceptualization of the 
relevant variables and the relationship between them. The Alcantara and 
Nelles (2009) framework—hereafter referred to as the “original framework”—
sharply divided variables between three categories: institutions, milieu vari-
ables, and civic capital. These categories permitted the authors to distinguish 
between different groups of variables in terms of their functions and relation-
ship to local governments. For instance, institutions were described as the 
relatively stable rules of the game, imposed by other levels of government, 
which shape local decision making. Opportunities, or milieu variables, were 
characterized as the more episodic types of events—difficult to predict and 
outside of the control of local authorities—that can alter local incentives to 
cooperate. These events can include natural occurrences, such as natural 
disasters, that increase the potential benefit of collective action for mutual 
aid; or political events such as the creation of a provincial grant or funding 
stream, which might either create incentives for local cooperation or compe-
tition depending on the formulation of the program. The main object of such 
a conceptualization was to distinguish between long-term and relatively pre-
dictable contextual conditions and those that are of shorter duration and more 
difficult to anticipate, but that nonetheless can profoundly influence local 
decision making. While these categories are relevant they also obscure what 
is, in our opinion, a more important but less distinctive difference between 
types of variables. That is, the relationship of different types of variables to 
the two poles of capacity and willingness to enter in to a cooperative 
partnership.
We argue that the decision to enter into a partnership is determined by 
two important factors: the capacity of actors to enter into such an arrange-
ment, and their willingness to do so. Capacity is defined as what partners are 
permitted to do by the structures that govern them as well as what they are 
able to do with the tools at their disposal. Willingness, by contrast, is the 
Nelles and Alcantara 11
degree to which actors are disposed to invoke their capacities to act. Where 
actors lack the capacity to enter into partnerships it is not surprising that they 
do not. Indeed, where partners are not significantly constrained by rules or 
resources (among other things) the emergence of cooperation is still not 
assured. It is therefore important to consider the factors that affect the politi-
cal will to sacrifice a degree of local autonomy, however small, to collective 
action. We contend that in cases in which all of the relevant actors have suf-
ficient capacity to enter into a partnership—recalling the assumption that all 
partners perceive potential benefit from such an arrangement—the emer-
gence of the partnership depends on the political will of each of the actors to 
engage in a cooperative relationship. One could even further imagine that 
sufficient political will could, in fact, overcome capacity barriers to coopera-
tion by actors lobbying to change legal restrictions and so on. Whatever the 
status of capacity, it is willingness that is the key. 
One of the main drawbacks to using the capacity/willingness conceptual-
ization is that while gaining clarity in defining the broad foundations of coop-
eration, we lose the neat categorical divisions of the original framework. 
Where institutions, milieu, and civic capital were distinctive groups of vari-
ables it is more difficult to clearly separate which variables affect capacity 
and which affect willingness. This is because some variables may have an 
influence on both elements of the framework. This phenomenon is discussed 
in more detail in the following sections; however, it is not difficult to imagine 
that something like the presence of antecedent governance arrangements may 
influence the ability of actors to partner (by providing a facilitating forum or 
model) and their willingness to do so (depending on whether their previous 
experience was positive or negative). As a result, we conceptualize the rela-
tionship between variables within the framework as inhabiting a spectrum 
(see Table 1). Variable types are arranged along the spectrum, between 
capacity and willingness, depending on their tendency to influence one to a 
great degree than the other. All seven sets of variables can affect both capac-
ity and willingness, but do so with varying strengths (i.e., institutions tend to 
affect capacity more than willingness, relative to other variables).
The Elements of Cooperation
This theoretical framework categorizes variables that may affect the 
emergence of cooperation between Aboriginal and municipal govern-
ments into seven groups: institutions, resources, external interventions, 
history, polarizing events, imperative, and community capital. Some remain 
quite similar to those posited in the original framework, while others are 
significant additions. These groups are discussed in the order in which they 
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are arrayed on the capacity-willingness axis, discussed above. For each 
empirical case study researchers must make a determination of the effect of 
each of the categories on the development, or not, of cooperation. While 
quantitative research using this framework is not impossible, we have envi-
sioned and constructed it primarily as a guide to qualitative investigations. 
Each group of variables, and the individual variables within each group, 
will have a positive, negative or no effect on cooperation. Researchers have 
the additional option to qualify their assessment with terms such as “strong” 
or “weak,” “major” or “minor” to distinguish differences in magnitude.
In case study research, there is often an explanation for success, or failure, 
that stands out immediately and that has been adopted as a consensus by 
popular media and opinion. One of the main functions of this framework is to 
encourage researchers to explore as many of the potential impacts on coop-
eration as possible to better understand the interaction between forces that 
produce certain outcomes. While it is possible that the same explanation will 
emerge as dominant upon deep analysis, this framework may still be useful 
to illuminate other minor, or even significant, contributing factors.
That said, in presenting this framework, we make no claims to absolute 
comprehensiveness nor do we expect that it will be applied unmodified by 
other researchers. As a framework, it provides a conceptual approach to the 
question of Aboriginal and municipal government cooperation and suggests 
an array of factors that our research indicates has the potential to influence 
this type of behavior. In the following section, we discuss each variable group 
and subtype in turn. We particularly note the degree to which each influences 
capacity and/or willingness and hypothesize the potential impact, positive or 
negative, on cooperation.
1. Institutions are the rules and norms (Hodgson 2006) that govern the 
decision-making processes of local government and Aboriginal actors. 
Institutions typically affect the degree to which actors are able to enter 
into specific types of agreements. However, the impact of institutional 
constraints can certainly also affect their willingness to do so. Among 
the most important institutional factors that can affect the emergence of 
cooperation are executive autonomy, jurisdictional autonomy and func-
tions, and treaty status and decision-making processes. Many of these 
are interrelated—that is, executive autonomy and decision-making 
processes—so it is likely that the effects of those variables will track 
together.
Executive autonomy: The degree to which executives are empowered to 
make decisions on behalf of their constituents without rigorous ratification 
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processes can liberate leaders to make commitments to partnerships. 
However, this autonomy can be a double-edged sword. Where leaders are 
committed to cooperation, then executive autonomy can ease the negotiation 
process by reducing the number of actors that need to be involved, and 
assuaged. Where one or more empowered executives oppose cooperation, 
however, they can also be incredibly powerful in blocking progress. It is 
therefore difficult to predict whether a relatively autonomous executive will 
be an advantage or barrier to cooperation. In the Canadian context, local gov-
ernment executives are typically quite weak and are rarely empowered to 
commit their bureaucracies without council approval. Lower autonomy does 
not necessarily preclude cooperation but can potentially add to the challenges 
of reaching a mutually beneficial agreement. The degree of executive auton-
omy of Aboriginal governments, however, can vary significantly from case 
to case. Executives may be bound by consensus decisions of the council or 
may enjoy more political freedom (Alcantara and Whitfield 2010). For most 
First Nations under the Indian Act, for instance, the powers of the chiefs are 
constrained by the need for band-council approval, and so executive auton-
omy is circumscribed, at least formally. Informally, however, executive 
autonomy varies from band to band, especially in communities where certain 
families dominate local band politics. In either case, there is likely to be a 
degree of asymmetry in executive autonomy that may prove frustrating to the 
party with fewer internal barriers to agreement.
Decision-making processes: As discussed above, the decision-making 
processes within local governments and Aboriginal governments may be 
quite different. Both the types of decision-making processes and the asym-
metry between them can function as barriers to the emergence of coopera-
tion. Where more individuals, and interests, are involved in negotiations the 
more difficult it can be to secure collective action (Olson 1965).
Legal status: The legal status of the Aboriginal government relative to oth-
ers in the Canadian federation can also complicate cooperation. Treaties and 
self-government agreements typically set out and clarify the lands, rights, 
and responsibilities of Aboriginal governments. Therefore, where treaties 
and self-government agreements exist, Aboriginal governments operate in a 
uniquely settled and transparent political space. Where treaties and self-
government agreements are not in force, or are in the process of negotiation, 
there may be a measure of uncertainty about the extent and limits of Aboriginal 
jurisdiction. This legal uncertainty can make cooperation with other govern-
ments more difficult to achieve, particularly in cases where treaties and self-
government agreements are in the process of being negotiated (Alcantara 
2008). From another perspective, the uncertainty generated by the negotia-
tion process (or lack thereof) may induce Aboriginal governments to seek 
14 Urban Affairs Review XX(X)
local partners to build political capital for future negotiations or extend their 
political reach on issue affecting their constituents.
2. Resources: Both Aboriginal and municipal authorities typically govern 
with relatively few resources, particularly outside of the larger cities 
and settlements. Where local and Aboriginal authorities have discre-
tionary funds to support joint projects cooperation will likely be easier 
to establish. The availability of financial resources can be important 
even when partnerships do not require significant monetary contribu-
tions. Even in the most ad hoc arrangements the process of meeting and 
coordination is not without costs (i.e., travel, renting conference facili-
ties, or providing refreshments). The ability of each party to share those 
costs can be significant to the conclusion of a successful agreement.
In addition to financial resources, administrative resources, time, and 
expertise can also influence cooperation. For instance, support staff may not 
be reliably available to manage communication and project implementation 
in governments—Aboriginal and municipal—with small or part-time staffs. 
Similarly, the time commitment required by elected officials and representa-
tives to conclude even simple agreements can be onerous. Where legal or 
specialized knowledge is required, local and Aboriginal officials may lack 
the expertise to proceed without external (and often expensive) assistance 
(Alcantara 2008; Evans 2011).
Every political decision entails a set of costs. Even the preliminary discus-
sions about the potential for partnerships are not entirely free. All actors 
shoulder some burdens—be they financial, administrative, or temporal—in 
the process of coming together and in maintaining the partnership. The extent 
to which each partner is able to spare the necessary resources can be an 
important factor in the emergence of collective action. The more discretion-
ary resources each partner has, the less likely that they will cite this factor as 
a barrier to cooperation.
3. External intervention—Occasionally, senior levels of government will 
become a factor in the construction of regional partnerships between 
municipal and Aboriginal governments (Gayda 2012). Senior levels of 
government, such as the provincial or federal governments in Canada, 
can influence the formation of local partnerships in two ways: directly, 
through direct participation in the negotiation process; or, indirectly, 
through policy actions that affect local decision making. The first, and 
more activist, instance is the easiest to identify and analyze. In these 
cases, the senior level of government either leads the formation of the 
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partnership, or is a member. This is most typical in areas where local 
and senior level jurisdictions intersect, as is the case with environmen-
tal governance (i.e., managing watersheds). Whether they are leaders 
or simply participants in the partnership, the presence of a senior level 
of government can bring enticements (such as resources) to the local 
participants; add weight to an issue and attract the participation of local 
actors; or impose requirements for local participation. All of these can 
significantly alter the decision-making processes of local actors toward 
cooperation.
Indirect influence by senior levels of government can be more difficult to 
detect, but can also be significant in promoting (or discouraging) partnership 
formation. For instance, a provincial government may pass new legislation 
requiring new environmental protections for locally owned land. To more 
economically satisfy this additional burden, local authorities may seek part-
nerships with other localities or governments. While these indirect influences 
are difficult to predict they can provide significant, and usually unintended, 
motivation for local cooperation.
4. Historical factors: Partnerships do not emerge in a vacuum—They are 
the product of, and conditioned by, the historical context in which they 
were nurtured. As such, the success of previous partnerships and the 
historical relationship between Aboriginal and local authorities can 
profoundly affect the willingness of partners to engage in collective 
action.
The success, or failure, of partnerships between local actors, even in unre-
lated policy areas, can be powerful indicators of the likely behavior and trust-
worthiness of the parties involved. Where partnerships have been successful, 
it is more likely that local actors will be willing to engage in another. Where 
previous partnerships, or negotiations, have failed the actors are likely to 
have negative memories of the experience and may be wary of another 
attempt.
Even where no other partnerships have been implemented, or attempted, 
the historical relationship between local and Aboriginal authorities will influ-
ence the decision-making process. The various levels of government in 
Canada and in other settler societies have a long history of colonialism with 
its Indigenous peoples. Indigenous peoples in Canada, for instance, have 
been subject to residential schools in which Indigenous children were forcibly 
removed form their families and placed in schools taught by non-Indigenous 
teachers, usually affiliated with Christian religions. Aboriginal traditional 
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governments have been erased and replaced with elected band councils, cre-
ating situations where traditional and elected Aboriginal leaders today strug-
gle with each other to govern their communities. Indigenous forms of property 
ownership have been replaced by Canadian ones, usually with profoundly 
negative consequences (Flanagan, Alcantara, and Le Dressay 2010). All of 
these historical factors can severely impact the ability of Indigenous and local 
governments to cooperate.
In addition to a colonial history of discriminatory policies, a failure to 
consult Aboriginal representatives on a development project, failure to pay 
for services on time, or an outspoken personality in either group can also sour 
relations between local authorities and affect the perceptions of contempo-
rary actors even when those people, policies, or developers are long gone 
(Alcantara and Nelles 2009). Rightly or wrongly, history has the potential to 
be a powerful barrier to cooperation (or even contemplating cooperation). 
While negative history is not insurmountable, the negative perceptions that it 
generates can be very difficult to overcome.
5. Polarizing events: Polarizing events are any kind of change that 
affects the calculus of any of the potential partners. These can be the 
product of individual decisions (such as the decision to implement a 
specific policy) or completely unpredictable events (such as natural 
disasters; Birkland 1997). A polarizing event can be a reason for a 
partnership to form, it can lead to the dissolution of what appeared to 
be successful negotiations, or it can lead to the dissolution of a part-
nership. As with external intervention, polarizing opportunities can 
be direct or indirect.
Direct polarizing events are those that are initiated by the actors involved 
in partnership negotiations themselves. If one partner decides to act in a way 
that will aggravate their partners, whether it is related to the substance of the 
partnership or not, this can constitute a polarizing event and introduce com-
plications into negotiations or threaten existing agreements. For instance, if 
an Aboriginal government decided to build an attraction on their land that 
competed with attractions in neighboring municipalities this may sour nego-
tiations on other issues, regardless if they are related or not. Knowingly pur-
suing policies that will be unpopular with (potential) partners can, intentionally 
or not, destabilize relationships and can be construed as an act in bad faith.
Indirect polarizing events are those initiated by actors outside of the part-
nership, or through an act of god, that significantly changes the incentives for 
cooperation. For instance, cooperation motivated by a change in legislation 
(such as the environmental example given above) may be negated by the 
emergence of a not-for-profit willing to fund local compliance. This would 
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remove the immediate need for at least one of the actors for cooperation on 
this issue. Similarly, a natural disaster, such as the flooding of a nearby river 
could prompt Aboriginal and local authorities to partner for flood manage-
ment and recovery. In this case, a shared threat can function as a positively 
polarizing event (Gayda 2012).
A significant feature of polarizing events is that their impact on partner-
ships can vary substantially, and their influence can be either positive or 
negative. An unpopular political decision by one of the actors may not neces-
sarily scuttle a partnership, but it can make it more difficult. The emergence 
of an alternative to cooperation (such as a new source of funding) can elimi-
nate the necessity for collective action altogether. As such, polarizing events 
can be incredibly powerful in partnership formation (or dissolution).
6. Imperatives: In most partnerships, the motivations for cooperation and 
the benefits that each partner received from cooperation vary. In some 
cases, a partnership that is merely convenient for one partner may be a 
necessity for the other(s). This asymmetry of “need,” or imperative for 
cooperation, need not necessarily be a factor in negotiations. However, 
it is possible to imagine a case where one actor, or several, badly needs 
the cooperation of the others. When the stakes are much higher because 
of the costs of failure a partner may be willing to overlook other miti-
gating circumstances (i.e., a history of bad blood, or the time it will 
take to get a deal done due to constraints on local autonomy). While 
these situations are most likely relatively rare, the imperatives that 
local decision makers face in approaching partnerships can be impor-
tant to understanding the emergence, or failure, of cooperation.
7. Community capital: Community capital is a combination of attributes 
of an urban region, and its peripheral settlements, that form a shared 
civic identity. These are the factors that form a feeling that municipal 
and Aboriginal communities are “in this together” in the minds of resi-
dents, political representatives and groups within the region. While 
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal communities may have separate gov-
erning structures, community capital blurs these jurisdictional bound-
aries to unite these groups as residents of a unique and shared—if 
politically fragmented—territorial space.
Community capital is unique among the variables listed here in that its 
effect on the emergence of cooperation will always be positive. While gov-
ernment intervention and imperatives, for instance, can have either positive 
or negative effects on cooperation depending on the context, where commu-
nity capital has a positive influence on the emergence of partnerships. Where 
18 Urban Affairs Review XX(X)
a collective and inclusive vision of the regional community is strong partner-
ships between Aboriginal and municipal governments will be more likely to 
be proposed and successfully negotiated.
This variable is also one of the most complicated to operationalize. It is 
difficult to measure collective identity and shared vision. In order to put some 
flesh on these conceptual bones we use a series of proxies that function as 
indicators of the depth of community capital. Principle among these is the 
degree of integration, participation in civic organizations across community 
boundaries, and regional leaders.
Social integration between Aboriginal and municipal communities can be 
an important indicator of mutual respect and shared identities. Where there is 
regular interaction between communities it is more likely that this sense of 
identity will emerge. Some indicators of social integration include such mea-
sures as the proportion of Aboriginal residents in the main municipality, the 
proportion of Aboriginal children in the municipal school population; shop-
ping and entertainment use patterns (i.e., Where do communities do their 
shopping, go to movies, or play sports?), and participation of Aboriginal indi-
viduals and families in municipal programs (such as sports leagues or volun-
teer groups). The degree of representation of Aboriginal individuals within 
the governance of school boards and civic groups is also a signal of social 
integration.
Nonpolitical intercommunity networks are also an important indicator of 
regional integration. Where more local civic groups are actively inclusive in 
their catchment areas it is more likely that a shared conception of community 
and vision have been established. This can be measured by surveying local 
civic groups—such as charities, churches, business associations, and com-
munity groups—to determine where they perceive the boundaries of their 
region, who their leadership “represents” and where they source new 
members.
Finally, community leaders who are active champions of inclusive civic 
engagement are one of the most visible dimensions of community capital. 
Where community leaders vocally pursue the joint interests of Aboriginal 
and non-Aboriginal communities they are likely to be reflecting the views of 
others in the region and be articulating a vision supported by a regional coali-
tion, if not by regional consensus. Such civic leaders can be identified through 
a combination of secondary sources (such as media reports) and by interview 
subjects. It is important to also get a sense of the level of support for these 
leaders (and opposition to them) to evaluate whether they are indeed indica-
tors of community capital or vocal outliers.
It is important to note that each of these aspects of community capital 
quite deliberately refers to community or civic integration, networks and 
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leaders, rather than existing political ties. Political relationships are excluded 
from this variable in order to avoid the trap of tautology, where the presence 
of political partnerships explains political partnerships. While previous polit-
ical partnerships may be significant, they are considered as historical factors 
rather than evidence of community capital. We argue that the social ties that 
are built between communities as a by-product of organic and ordinary inter-
action form the basis of a shared identity that can lead to a greater willingness 
on the part of political actors—and their constituents—to consider formal 
political partnerships between Aboriginal and municipal governments for 
their collective benefit. This collective identity may, in some cases, be pow-
erful enough to overcome barriers imposed by the previous six factors that 
might be intractable in more divided communities. To be clear, the argument 
that we make here is that the deeper social ties are between communities the 
more likely that formal political partnerships will form. Social integration 
and ties are not partnerships. Thus, we are not attempting to explain the for-
mation of political relationships between Aboriginal and local governments 
by the presence of existing partnerships, but by the degree of intercommunity 
integration.
We have also deliberately chosen to use the language of “capital” to 
anchor this concept. We do so as a direct acknowledgment of the conceptu-
ally related concepts of social (Coleman 1988; Evers 2003; Lin 2001; Putnam 
2000) and civic capital (Henton and Melville 1997; Potapchuk and Crocker 
1999; Wagner 2004; Wolfe and Nelles 2008) that also rely on the presence of 
networks, civic engagement, and trust to explain phenomenon such as collec-
tive action and innovation. While our formulation certainly owes an intel-
lectual debt to these predecessors, community capital is a unique and 
specialized variation on their conceptual themes. Perhaps most importantly, 
the term capital implies a resource that can be accrued (or lost), used to pro-
ductive purposes (or squandered). Community capital will not inevitably 
increase over time. Nor is it immune to depreciation if community interaction 
wanes. As such, it is important to judge the emergence of each partnership 
relative to community capital at that point in time rather than through the lens 
of the present.
The seven dimensions of this theoretical framework were envisioned to 
provide a better understanding of the emergence of relationships between 
Aboriginal and municipal governments. Applying this framework to empiri-
cal cases will enable researchers to explore which of these is/are most power-
ful in predicting the emergence of these types of partnerships and develop a 
more robust theory of Aboriginal-municipal government relations.
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Conclusion
The goal of this article was to specify a more comprehensive theoretical 
framework to inform future empirical analyses of the factors that produce 
formal cooperation between Indigenous and local governments. To do so, we 
drew upon the existing literatures on intermunicipal cooperation, metropoli-
tan governance, and Aboriginal-municipal intergovernmental relations to 
identify a set of variables that might affect both the willingness and capacity 
of Aboriginal and local governments to cooperate. This framework, we think, 
provides a more useful and theoretically grounded way of identifying possi-
ble factors that might influence intergovernmental cooperation between these 
actors in a variety of contexts and countries.
Given the importance of conceptual clarity and comprehensiveness when 
specifying a new theoretical framework, we choose to write a stand-alone 
article that fully specified the framework, much in the tradition of some of 
Feiock’s work (2007, 2009), rather than providing a much shorter specifica-
tion of the theory accompanied by empirical analysis. The main advantage of 
this approach is that the full theoretical scope and implications of the new 
framework can be specified and discussed, allowing other researchers to 
immediately begin testing and analyzing it. The main disadvantage, of course, 
is that the robustness of the framework can only be challenged (and defended) 
on theoretical grounds. In our view, however, a full specification of the theo-
retical framework at the expense of empirical analysis is an important contri-
bution, especially when no competing theoretical framework currently exists. 
Of course, future empirical work is needed not only to test the robustness of 
the framework’s theoretical propositions but also to modify and improve its 
explanatory power and generalizability among Indigenous groups and across 
countries.
Future researchers might apply this framework in a number of ways. 
Scholars might analyze the effect of the three sets of factors that affect capac-
ity the most—institutions, resources, and external interventions—by examin-
ing various types of Indigenous self-government models in Canada and the 
United States. In both countries, Aboriginal groups and American Indian 
tribes have access to a wide range of internal institutional designs. In Canada, 
for instance, the majority of groups have band-council style governments, 
with a small but growing number of groups adopting new forms of self-
government through the creation of new Aboriginal constitutions and the 
signing of self-government agreements with the Crown (Alcantara and 
Whitfield 2010). Similarly, in the United States, there exists significant varia-
tion in the governance structures that American Indian tribes have adopted 
(Wilkins 2002). In both countries, each of these different governance structures 
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is accompanied by a certain type of fiscal arrangement and relationship with 
the relevant federal/national and provincial/territorial/state governments.
Other researchers interested in the effect of history and polarizing events 
could also interrogate these factors either comparatively or within one coun-
try. Our preliminary research suggests that Aboriginal and local governments 
across Canada, for instance, have different historical relationships with each 
other. The government of Sault Ste. Marie in northern Ontario has a history 
of both amicable and contentious relations with different neighboring First 
Nations. Similarly, the city has experienced polarizing events that have 
involved all of its neighboring First Nations communities.
The effects of imperative and community capital could also be examined 
comparatively or within a single country. The prospect of partnership failure 
and the differing costs that might stem from that failure is something that all 
Aboriginal and local communities face, regardless of region or country. 
Similarly, there exists a wide variety of communities with differing levels of 
social integration, intercommunity networks, and prominent civic leaders in 
settler countries like Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. 
In Canada alone, for instance, scholars might focus on one large metropolitan 
area, like Vancouver, to examine the effects of these factors. Indeed, the city 
of Vancouver has varying levels of imperative and community capital with 
the many First Nations communities that fall within or outside of its munici-
pal borders.
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Notes
1. In this article, we seek to craft a comprehensive and general theory of Aboriginal-
local intergovernmental relations. Some might argue that our approach is prob-
lematic because it is not consistent with recent scholarly trends that emphasize 
Indigenous methodologies and postmodern and poststructural approaches. We 
believe that there is value in approaching topics involving Aboriginal-settler 
relations from a variety of epistemological and ontological perspectives. One of 
the key messages from Indigenous scholars is that the western research tradition 
needs to be open and welcoming of Indigenous ways of knowing. We agree. 
However, doing so does not preclude others from using conventional social 
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science approaches to study Aboriginal-settler relations.
2. While this framework was developed for the Canadian context, it has been con-
structed as generally as possible in order to permit analysis of Aboriginal-local 
government relationships in other countries.
3. Note that this does not mean that there must be consensus between the cooperat-
ing parties about what the mutual benefit is; just that both parties perceive mutual 
benefit to be possible.
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